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Crawford/Davis "Testimonial" Interpreted,
Removing the Clutter; Application Summary
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM*
HYPOTHETICAL
John, age twelve, comes running out the front door of a condomin-
ium high-rise building. He runs right up to two men talking to each
other on the sidewalk in front of the building. John blurts out, "Oh my
God!!! My mom just pushed my dad off the balcony of our twentieth-
story condo!!! What should I do now?" One of the two men is a plain-
clothes police officer. The other is an old friend from college, now
working as a stock broker.
Is John's statement "testimonial" in a criminal prosecution of his
mom for homicide? Does it matter who testifies to the existence of the
statement?
SYNOPSIS OF CRAWFORD AND DAVIS
In Crawford v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
"testimonial" statement is not admissible under the Confrontation
Clause if the out-of-court declarant does not testify at the criminal trial
subject to cross-examination unless the criminal defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.' The Supreme Court, however,
stated, "[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehen-
sive definition of 'testimonial,"' while adding "[w]hatever else the term
covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hear-
ing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial; and to police
interrogations."2
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority and taking a historical
approach, stated that with respect to the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause the history of the Sixth Amendment supports two inferences.'
"First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to dedicate this
article to John T. Gaubatz, who was a very close and personal friend. John and his wife, Kathy,
were very kind to me in a moment of need for which I will always be grateful.
1. 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
2. Id. at 68.
3. Id. at 50.
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ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused,"4 i.e., "flagrant
inquisitorial practices."5 Second, "the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination."6
With respect to defining "testimonial" statements, Crawford states:
Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" state-
ments exist: "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examina-
tions, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasona-
bly expect to be used prosecutorially,"; "extrajudicial statements...
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, dep-
ositions, prior testimony, or confessions,"; "statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial." These formulations all share a common nucleus and
then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction
around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements
qualify under any definition-for example, ex parte testimony at a
preliminary hearing.7
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interroga-
tions are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.8
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent
with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their devel-
opment of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach
that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavail-
ability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. We leave for
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of "tes-
timonial." Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modem prac-
tices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed. 9
Justice Scalia's already famous reference that the "[v]arious formu-
4. Id.
5. Id. at 51.
6. Id. at 53-54.
7. Id. at 51-52 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 52.
9. Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 62:811
20081 CRAWFORD/DAVIS "TESTIMONIAL" INTERPRETED 813
lation of this core class of 'testimonial' statements exist"'" followed by
two of three formulations incorporating a focus on the "reasonable"
expectation of the declarant is a classic illustration of antinomy, i.e., a
contradiction in logic, in this case the process of reliance on that which
had previously been rejected. The parties and amicus curiae clearly rea-
sonably assumed that if the U.S. Supreme Court chose to reinvent the
Confrontation Clause once again as it did in Dutton v. Evans" and then
again in Ohio v. Roberts,'" that the Court would bear in mind that the
Confrontation Clause itself speaks of "confronted with witnesses against
him" and thus focus on the "reasonable" expectation or belief that the
statement would be used "against" the accused at trial by the prosecu-
tion.' 3 One way to view the issue of "reasonable" expectation or belief
is to ask whether the statement is "accusatory in nature," i.e., may be of
assistance in the apprehension or prosecution of a criminal defendant.
But Crawford's majority rejected this more obvious "plain meaning" of
the Confrontation Clause in favor of focusing solely on governmental
conduct in acquiring evidence against the accused. Simply put, Justice
Scalia set forth two inferences that history supports as to the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause, and only two inferences.'4 When Justice
Scalia unfortunately and confusingly attempted to define testimonial, he
had simply failed to realize that any reference to a declarant's "reasona-
ble" belief or expectation was simply completely outside the scope of
the protection of the Confrontation Clause as previously clearly deline-
ated and, as importantly, completely unrelated to the reasons, i.e., the
two inferences, set forth in support thereof.
Yet given the absence in Crawford of a "comprehensive definition
of 'testimonial',"'" it was not surprising that lower courts immediately
employed a plethora of interpretations of "testimonial" leading to con-
flicting results. Of particular concern was the lack of coherence in the
numerous decisions addressing whether 911 calls and statements made
to police officers on arrival at the scene were "testimonial."
In response, in Davis v. Washington, Justice Scalia, once again
writing for the majority, stated:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in
10. Id. at 51.
11. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
12. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
13. See Brief for the Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2003) (No. 02-9410);
Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410).
14. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
15. Id. at 68.
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response to police interrogation-as either testimonial or nontestimo-
nial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: State-
ments are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the pri-
mary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circum-
stances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.' 
6
Davis continued that statements volunteered to a government official
may also be testimonial if the primary purpose on receipt of such state-
ments is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution. 17 Whether the circumstances surrounding the
making of the out-of-court statement were formal and solemn, and
whether the statement resulted from police interrogation or judicial
examination-components of the concept of "testimonial" contained in
Crawford, see infra-were completely abandoned as significant to Con-
frontation Clause analysis in Davis."
Under Davis, any statement made to or elicited by a police officer,
16. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 2274 n. I ("Our holding refers to interrogations because, as explained below, the
statements in the cases presently before us are the products of interrogations-which in some
circumstances tend to generate testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that
statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to
open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation. (Part of the
evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result
of sustained questioning.) And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis
the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires
us to evaluate." (citation omitted)).
18. Justice Scalia, in response to Justice Thomas's dissent, feebly, unsuccessfully, and
unnecessarily, attempts to assert a continued relevance of solemnity, an impossible task in the
context of an oral volunteered statement to a 911 operator, on the basis that making a statement
that is a deliberate falsehood to an investigating officer is criminal:
The question before us in Davis, then, is whether, objectively considered, the
interrogation that took place in the course of the 911 call produced testimonial
statements. When we said in Crawford that "interrogations by law enforcement
officers fall squarely within [the] class" of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately
in mind (for that was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to
convict) the perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a
writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of
the interrogating officer, is testimonial. It is, in the terms of the 1828 American
dictionary quoted in Crawford," '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact."' (The solemnity of even an oral
declaration of relevant past fact to an investigating officer is well enough
established by the severe consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.) A
911 call, on the other hand, and at least the initial interrogation conducted in
connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed primarily to "establis[h] or
(Vol. 62:811
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other law-enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer under circum-
stances objectively indicating at the time made that the primary purpose
to which the statement will be used by the government is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecutions is
"testimonial."' 9 Statements that are "testimonial" are not admissible
under the Confrontation Clause if the out-of-court declarant does not
testify at the criminal trial subject to cross-examination, unless the crim-
inal defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 0 Con-
versely, any statement made to or elicited by a police officer, other law-
enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer under circumstances objec-
tively indicating at the time made that the primary purpose to which the
statement will be used by the government is other than prosecution of a
past criminal event is "nontestimonial."' In addition to curtailment of
an ongoing crime, the other primary purpose encompassed by the term
"emergency" in Davis, protection of the police and third parties, as well
as the victim from immediate further attack illustrate primary other pur-
poses.22 Although emergency as another primary purpose in Davis was
not defined, emergency logically extends to circumstances requiring
assistance from medical personnel, firefighters, or other governmental
services such as those dealing with hazardous materials.
Very importantly, note that even though Davis, like Crawford
before it,23 explicitly declined to present a comprehensive definition of
"testimonial," Davis clearly supports the proposition that all other state-
ments are not "testimonial"-namely, statements where the primary pur-
pose to which the statement is employed at the time received does not
relate to prosecuting a past criminal event, even when made to a govern-
ment official.24 Thus, as occurred in Davis, a 911 call to an operator
considered a government official, describing an ongoing emergency as
to which the police will be called to act is "nontestimonial," while any
statements made once the emergency has ceased are "testimonial" as the
primary purpose on the part of the government viewed objectively
prov[e]" some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police
assistance.
Id. at 2276 (first and second alteration in original) (citations omitted). If the Confrontation Clause
is concerned solely with the primary purpose to which a statement is put to use when received by
a government official, whether the declarant is "solemn" is completely irrelevant. Finally, an
excited utterance made to 911 on its face is the complete opposite of "solemn."
19. Id. at 2273-74.
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
21. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
22. Id.
23. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial'.").
24. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
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shifted from responding to the emergency to proving past events rele-
vant to later criminal prosecution.2 ' All statements made to someone
25. "The relevant statements in Davis v. Washington were made to a 911 emergency operator
on February 1, 2001. When the operator answered the initial call, the connection terminated before
anyone spoke. She reversed the call, and Michelle McCottry answered. In the ensuing
conversation, the operator ascertained that McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with
her former boyfriend Adrian Davis, the petitioner in [Davis]:
"911 Operator: Hello.
"Complainant: Hello.
"911 Operator: What's going on?
"Complainant: He's here jumpin' on me again.
"911 Operator: Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are you in a house or an
apartment?
"Complainant: I'm in a house.
"911 Operator: Are there any weapons?
"Complainant: No. He's usin' his fists.
"911 Operator: Okay. Has he been drinking?
"Complainant: No.
"911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I've got help started. Stay on the line with me,
okay?
"Complainant: I'm on the line.
"911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last name?
"Complainant: It's Davis.
"911 Operator: Davis? Okay, what's his first name?
"Complainant: Adrian




"911 Operator: Okay. What's his middle initial?
"Complainant: Martell. He's runnin' now."
As the conversation continued, the operator learned that Davis had "just r[un]
out the door" after hitting McCottry, and that he was leaving in a car with someone
else. McCottry started talking, but the operator cut her off, saying, "Stop talking
and answer my questions." She then gathered more information about Davis
(including his birthday), and learned that Davis had told McCottry that his purpose
in coming to the house was "to get his stuff," since McCottry was moving.
McCottry described the context of the assault, after which the operator told her that
the police were on their way. "They're gonna check the area for him first," the
operator said, "and then they're gonna come talk to you."
The police arrived within four minutes of the 911 call and observed McCottry's
shaken state, the "fresh injuries on her forearm and her face," and her "frantic
efforts to gather her belongings and her children so that they could leave the
residence."
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270-71 (citations omitted). It is unclear exactly when during the
conversation the 911 operator notified the police to proceed to the location of the domestic
disturbance. Under Davis, even if the police were dispatched only on conclusion of the
conversation, a point in time at which statements received had ceased being "testimonial," even
though no emergency would have thus existed when the police were dispatched, the initial
statements made by the caller up to the point of disclosure that the perpetrator had "just r[un] out
the door" and was leaving in a car with someone else would nevertheless be admissible
"nontestimonial" excited utterances. Primary purpose under Davis is thus determined at the
moment of receipt.
[Vol. 62:811
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other than a government official are always "nontestimonial;" unavaila-
bility of the declarant for cross-examination does not preclude admissi-
bility against the criminal defendant.26
Davis, both from what it states and does not state, clearly opines
that the objective circumstance is to be considered from the eliciting or
receiving government agent's perspective and not from the declarant's
in determining the primary purpose to which such statements are to be
employed. 7 Thus, consistent with the two historical inferences
described in Crawford of consequence in determining the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause, it is solely the conduct of police officers, other
law-enforcement personnel, and judicial officers that is of concern.
In short, while Davis expressly states that it is not presenting a
comprehensive definition of "testimonial,"28 Davis may nevertheless in
fact have done so, or come very close to having done so, and thus be the
"another day" referred to in Crawford.9 Davis, by its facts, considered
together with what it said and didn't say, clearly rejects all three of the
possible definitions of "testimonial" suggested in Crawford, including in
particular any focus on whether hearsay statements made by the nontes-
tifying out-of-court declarants were statements "that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorily," or "were made under cir-
cumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial."3 In Davis,
the declarant's 911 statement that Davis was then beating on her and the
later statement that Davis had just run out the door after hitting her
would both be statements an objective witness would reasonably expect
or believe would be available for use at a later trial.31 If a statement to
law enforcement reporting a current crime and a subsequent statement
reporting a past crime do not meet the foregoing concept of "reasonable
expect or belief," it is hard to imagine a statement that would. Yet no
mention of such a fact was made in Davis whatsoever. Instead, Davis
focused its definition of testimonial solely on the eliciting or receiving
police officer, other law-enforcement personnel, or judicial officer ask-
ing whether at the time made the primary purpose to which the statement
will be used by the government is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.32 In Davis, the initial
statement received for the primary purpose of responding to an emer-
26. See cases cited infra note 104.
27. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
28. Id. at 2273.
29. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
30. Id. at 51-52 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271.
32. Id. at 2273-74.
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gency case was declared nontestimonial while the subsequent statement
was held to be testimonial in that the primary purpose to which the state-
ment was employed by the police was "to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."33 Similarly, as Craw-
ford is currently being interpreted, a statement made by a doorman that
Mr. Smith left by taxi at about 6:00 a.m. yesterday morning to a police
officer would be testimonial regardless of the fact that since the state-
ment is not accusatory in nature, an objective witness would not reason-
ably expect or believe the statement to be used in a later trial, unless one
unreasonably was to conclude that every statement made to law enforce-
ment satisfies the test of reasonable expect or belief, thus making the in
fact nonexistent requirement of reasonable expect or belief once again
meaningless. On the other hand, a statement made to a police officer,
"Call 911 and get an ambulance, my son just shot his father," would be
nontestimonial according to Davis as the primary purpose on receipt
would be to respond to a medical emergency in spite of the fact that the
declarant, as an objective witness, would reasonably expect or believe
that the statement would be used in a later trial. The declarant's expec-
tations or beliefs are irrelevant-only the primary purpose to which the
police officer, other law-enforcement personnel, or judicial officer puts
the statement is of concern in determining whether a statement is testi-
monial. Obviously, all statements not being testified to by a police
officer, other law-enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer are
nontestimonial.
Any analysis, evaluation, or prediction concerning Crawford, as
narrowed in Davis, must begin and end with the caveat that given the
variety of approaches taken by the lower courts both to Lilly v. Vir-
ginia34 and to Crawford, one should fully expect the tremendous diver-
sity of interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to continue, with a
significant number of court decisions clearly running in the face of the
Davis narrowing of Crawford. Simply put, one expects, for example,
that several courts would continue to espouse the view that a declarant's
reasonable expectation or belief, objective or subjective, that the state-
ment would be used "against" the accused by the prosecution at trial
makes the statement "testimonial"-at least when made to a government
official. This likelihood is enhanced by the fact that Davis neither
explicitly dismisses this possible formulation of "testimonial" nor pur-
ports to present a comprehensive definition of "testimonial." Such opin-
ions have indeed been forthcoming.35 In short, various contrary
33. Id. at 2274 (footnote omitted).
34. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
35. See cases cited infra note 54.
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viewpoints, some politically inspired while others simply incredulous
and unaccepting that Davis actually says what it clearly says, will con-
tinue to be espoused in spite of the extremely clear narrowing of Craw-
ford by Davis.
Finally, what role is played by the Confrontation Clause, if any, in
governing the admissibility of hearsay statements that are "nontestimo-
nial" admitted pursuant to a hearsay exception made by a declarant who
does not testify at the criminal trial subject to cross-examination? In
other words, is the Roberts "firmly rooted" or "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness" requirement 36 applicable to "nontestimonial" state-
ments of nontestifying declarants? After Crawford failed to directly
address this issue, lower courts almost unanimously concluded that Rob-
erts did govern "nontestimonial" statements.37 Davis, however, opines
that the Confrontation Clause applies only to "testimonial" hearsay
statements from which it follows that Roberts does not govern admissi-
bility under the Confrontation Clause of "nontestimonial" statements.
That Crawford did in fact overrule Roberts was confirmed in Whorton v.
Bockting, which held that Crawford/Davis does not apply
retroactively.38
DEFINING "TESTIMONIAL" AND "NONTESTIMONIAL"
What, if anything, is the role in making a Crawford/Davis testimo-
nial-versus-nontestimonial determination of the concepts of "interroga-
tion," "formality," "solemnity," "structured," "bearing testimony," and
finally and very importantly the mental state of the declarant, i.e.,
whether, objectively or subjectively viewed, the declarant would have
reasonably expected or believed his statement to be used or to be availa-
ble for use by the prosecution at a later trial? While each of the forego-
ing terms and concepts are discussed in Crawford and several in Davis,
none has any role to play at all in determining whether a statement is or
is not testimonial.
Simply put, under Crawford and Davis a hearsay statement is "tes-
timonial" when, and only when, the statement of a nongovernment offi-
cial (1) was made to or elicited by a police officer, other law-
enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer ("government official"), and
36. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Although
Crawford reformed the Confrontation Clause analysis regarding out-of-court testimonial
statements, this court has held that the Ohio v. Roberts line of cases continues to control as to
nontestimonial statements.") (citation omitted); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir.
2004) ("Crawford leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to nontestimonial
statements.").
38. 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007).
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(2) was made to or elicited by a government official under circum-
stances objectively indicating at the time that the primary purpose to
which the statement will be used by the government is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Conversely, a hearsay statement is "nontestimonial" when, and only
when, the nongovernment official's statement was either (1) made to or
elicited by someone who is not a police officer, other law-enforcement
personnel, or a judicial officer, or (2) was in fact made to or elicited by a
government official under circumstances objectively indicating at the
time made that the primary purpose to which the statement will be used
by the government is something other than establishing or proving past
events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. In the con-
text of Davis, some such other purposes were collectively referred to as
"meet[ing] an ongoing emergency."39 In fact, any primary purpose on
the part of the government on receiving or eliciting the statement from a
nongovernment official other than to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution makes the statement
"nontestimonial."
HYPOTHETICAL: ANSWER
Applying the definition of "testimonial" developed above, the same
statement made by John, age twelve, is "testimonial" if testified to by
the plain-clothes police officer, but "nontestimonial" if testified to by the
stockbroker.
THE CLUTTER IN CRAWFORD/DAVIS: THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES
The conclusion that Davis mandates that John's statement, "Oh my
God!!! My mom just pushed my dad over the balcony of our twentieth-
story condo!!! What should I do now?" be classified as testimonial
when testified to by the plain-clothes police officer, but nontestimonal
when testified to by the stockbroker, illustrates and exemplifies that
most of the criteria once suggested in Crawford as possibly relevant,
some, but by no means all being also mentioned in Davis, are simply
irrelevant in practice and in theory in determining whether a statement is
testimonial. The now simply "clutter" concepts originally introduced in
Crawford and made clearly irrelevant under Davis include "interroga-
tion," "formality," "solemnity," "structured," the summary term "bear
testimony," and finally, and very importantly, the mental state of the
declarant, objectively or subjectively viewed, i.e., would the declarant
39. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273.
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reasonably expect or believe his statement to be used or available for use
by the prosecution at a later trial.
John's statement in any reasonable sense was voluntary and not the
product of "interrogation," "structured" or otherwise, was informal
rather than "formal," the surrounding circumstances did not indicate
"solemnity," not even under the fallacious argument of solemnity
espoused in Davis supposedly brought about solely because one under a
state of excitement exclaims to a police officer, i.e., it is criminal to lie
to the police.4" (John couldn't possibly know one of the two men was a
police officer.) Moreover, whether John, objectively or subjectively,
would have reasonably expected or believed his statement to be used or
be available for use by the prosecution at a later criminal trial is com-
pletely irrelevant. Under Davis, the government official's primary pur-
pose on obtaining the statement alone controls. Each term or concept is
simply clutter that clouds courts from reaching a clear understanding of
the Davis limitation modification and clarification of Crawford. If
Davis on its facts and on its holding compels the conclusion that John's
statement to the plain-clothes police officer is "testimonial," as it most
certainly does, there simply is no role to be played by the foregoing
terms and concepts. Thus it follows like night the day that all references
to such terms and concepts are confusing, unhelpful, and, most critically,
simply wrong.
Nevertheless, this clutter unfortunately continues to raise its useless
head in many decisions,4 ' which is not surprising given the lack of clar-
ity in Crawford, even as modified and restricted in Davis. The very
disappointing fact that Davis itself expressly states that it is not present-
ing a comprehensive definition of testimonial when it may have done so,
or come extremely close to having done so, as will be suggested below,
clearly does not encourage courts to search for the meaning of "testimo-
nial" based on what Davis actually holds.
CRA WFORD INTRODUCTION
Crawford speaks of "bear testimony" as equivalent to a "witness"
against the accused.4 2 "Testimony" is stated to be "[a] solemn declara-
tion or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact."4 3 Finally, Crawford in this context opines that "[a]n accuser who
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a
40. See supra note 18.
41. See cases cited infra notes 51, 53.
42. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 42) (alteration in original).
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sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not."" Crawford herein introduces the concept of "bear testimony,"
"solemnity," and "formality" all at once. Crawford later speaks of
"interrogation" referring in that context to "structured" as well.45 Craw-
ford opines: "In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely con-
cerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and
interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that
class. 46
Footnote 4 states:
We use the term "interrogation" in its colloquial, rather than any
technical legal, sense. Just as various definitions of "testimonial"
exist, one can imagine various definitions of "interrogation," and we
need not select among them in this case. Sylvia's recorded statement,
knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, quali-
fies under any conceivable definition.47
DAVIS CONTINUATION
Davis feebly, unsuccessfully, and most critically inexplicably and
inconsistently attempts to retain some utility for each of the foregoing
concepts. With respect to "interrogation," Davis concludes that simple
questions from the 911 operator such as, "What's going on?" and "Do
you know his last name?" constitute "interrogation." Moreover, in foot-
note 1, Davis is forced to recognize that even a volunteered statement
can be testimonial:
Our holding refers to interrogations because ... the statements
in the cases presently before us are the products of interrogations-
which in some circumstances tend to generate testimonial responses.
This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of
any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers were
no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testi-
mony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt
answers to detailed interrogation. (Part of the evidence against Sir
Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not
the result of sustained questioning.) And of course even when inter-
rogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements,
not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause
requires us to evaluate.48
This last sentence that "in the final analysis" it is the declarant's state-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 53 & n.4.
46. Id. at 53 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 53 n.4 (citation omitted).
48. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006).
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ment "that the Confrontation Clause requires [the Supreme Court] to
evaluate" simply means that the content of the declarant's statement is
necessarily critical in determining the primary purpose to which the
statement will be used by government officials to whom the statement
was made, nothing more and nothing less.
Davis unfortunately attempts in the context of a simple, for all
intents and purposes volunteered, 911 call to attempt to preserve some
utility for the concepts of "interrogation," "formality," "solemnity," and
even "structured" questioning and with them "bear testimony":
The question before us in Davis, then, is whether, objectively
considered, the interrogation that took place in the course of the 911
call produced testimonial statements. When we said in Crawford that
"interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within [the]
class" of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that
was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at establishing
the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to
convict) the perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether
reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the
memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimo-
nial. It is, in the terms of the 1828 American dictionary quoted in
Crawford, "'[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the pur-
pose of establishing or proving some fact.'" (The solemnity of even
an oral declaration of relevant past fact to an investigating officer is
well enough established by the severe consequences that can attend a
deliberate falsehood.) A 911 call, on the other hand, and at least the
initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordi-
narily not designed primarily to "establis[h] or prov[e]" some past
fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.
The difference between the interrogation in Davis and the one in
Crawford is apparent on the face of things. In Davis, McCottry was
speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than
"describe[ing] past events." Sylvia Crawford's interrogation, on the
other hand, took place hours after the events she described had
occurred. Moreover, any reasonable listener would recognize that
McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an ongoing emer-
gency. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a
crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry's call was plainly a call
for help against bona fide physical threat. Third, the nature of what
was asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was
such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve
the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford)
what had happened in the past. That is true even of the operator's
effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched
officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent
felon. And finally, the difference in the level of formality between
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the two interviews is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at
the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interroga-
tor taping and making notes of her answers; McCottry's frantic
answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was
not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could
make out) safe.
We conclude from all this that the circumstances of McCottry's
interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She simply was not
acting as a witness; she was not testifying. What she said was not "a
weaker substitute for live testimony" at trial, like Lord Cobham's
statements in Raleigh's Case, or Jane Dingler's ex parte statements
against her husband in King v. Dingler, or Sylvia Crawford's state-
ment in Crawford. In each of those cases, the ex parte actors and the
evidentiary products of the ex parte communication aligned perfectly
with their courtroom analogues. McCottry's emergency statement
does not. No "witness" goes into court to proclaim an emergency
and seek help.
Davis seeks to cast McCottry in the unlikely role of a witness by
pointing to English cases. None of them involves statements made
during an ongoing emergency. In King v. Brasier, for example, a
young rape victim, "immediately on her coming home, told all the
circumstances of the injury" to her mother. The case would be help-
ful to Davis if the relevant statement had been the girl's screams for
aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by the time the
victim got home, her story was an account of past events.
This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interro-
gation to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the
Indiana Supreme Court put it, "evolve into testimonial statements,"
once that purpose has been achieved. In this case, for example, after
the operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of
the moment, the emergency appears to have ended (when Davis
drove away from the premises). The operator then told McCottry to
be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could read-
ily be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry's statements
were testimonial, not unlike the "structured police questioning" that
occurred in Crawford. This presents no great problem. Just as, for
Fifth Amendment purposes, "police officers can and will distinguish
almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own
safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to
elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect," trial courts will recognize
the point at which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in
response to interrogations become testimonial. Through in limine
procedure, they should redact or exclude the portions of any state-
ment that have become testimonial, as they do, for example, with
unduly prejudicial portions of otherwise admissible evidence.
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Davis's jury did not hear the complete 911 call, although it may well
have heard some testimonial portions. We were asked to classify
only McCottry's early statements identifying Davis as her assailant,
and we agree with the Washington Supreme Court that they were not
testimonial. That court also concluded that, even if later parts of the
call were testimonial, their admission was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. Davis does not challenge that holding, and we therefore
assume it to be correct.
49
As for the charge that our holding is not a "targeted attempt to
reach the abuses forbidden by the [Confrontation] Clause," which the
dissent describes as the depositions taken by Marian magistrates,
characterized by a high degree of formality: We do not dispute that
formality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance. But we no
longer have examining Marian magistrates; and we do have, as our
18th-century forebears did not, examining police officers-who per-
form investigative and testimonial functions once performed by
examining Marian magistrates. It imports sufficient formality, in our
view, that lies to such officers are criminal offenses. Restricting the
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was origi-
nally directed is a recipe for its extinction.5 °
EVALUATION OF CRAWFORD/DAVIS CLUTTER
Viewing the hypothetical illustration in light of the conclusion
mandated by Davis that the same statement is testimonial when testified
to by the plain-clothes police officer but nontestimonial when testified to
by the stockbroker, it becomes patent that everything else introduced in
Crawford is irrelevant clutter regardless of whether a feeble attempt was
made in Davis to opine that such matters matter. The statement was
volunteered, not the product of any interrogation, a result explicitly
sanctioned in Davis; the statement was not the result of structured ques-
tioning, no questioning occurred at all; the statement possessed no for-
mality, being an oral statement not under oath to strangers in front of a
condominium building; and the statement was not solemn, the supposed
solemnity brought about by the fact that lying to the police is a crime
was not present as the police officer was in plain clothes. Nor does the
statement "bear testimony" as it was neither formal nor solemn nor
made by the declarant to prove some fact; the son in shock was not
accusatory in his own mind but rather simply reporting a horrible event
to someone he hoped would help him in some unspecified and probably
uncontemplated manner. Primary purpose for which the statement was
49. Id. at 2776-78 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 2278 n.5 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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elicited or received by the government official as the determining factor
for testimonial versus nontestimonial simply does not contemplate,
incorporate, or permit consideration of any such clutter.5'
Finally, and very importantly, the declarant's mental state, whether
viewed objectively or subjectively, is irrelevant, i.e., whether the declar-
ant would reasonably expect or believe his statement would be used or
be available for use by the prosecution at a later trial does not impact on
whether the statement is testimonial. If the 911 statement in Davis that
"He's here jumpin' on me again," is not one that meets not one but both
of the formulations in Crawford suggested as possible definitions of tes-
timonial implicating the mental state of the declarant, no statement
would so qualify. Yet the statement was found to be nontestimonial; no
mention of the mental state of the declarant appears in Davis whatso-
ever. Very importantly, nor should it, as the mental state of the declar-
ant is simply not within the core concern of the Confrontation Clause as
stated in Crawford:
[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. It was these
practices that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh's; that the Marian statutes invited; that English law's asser-
tion of a right to confrontation was meant to prohibit; and that the
founding-era rhetoric decried. The Sixth Amendment must be inter-
preted with this focus in mind.5"
Fortunately, Davis removed the declarant's mental state from con-
sideration as a potential contributing factor in defining testimonial. As
developed below, what would be useful in further development of "testi-
monial" would be an introduction of the prerequisite concept of "accusa-
51. Naturally enough, some courts miss the boat and continue to maintain the relevance of
clutter. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 216-17 (Cal. 2007) ("We derive several basic
principles from Davis. First .. . the confrontation clause is concerned solely with hearsay
statements that are testimonial, in that they are out-of-court analogs, in purpose and form, of the
testimony given by witnesses at trial. Second, though a statement need not be sworn under oath to
be testimonial, it must have occurred under circumstances that imparted, to some degree, the
formality and solemnity characteristic of testimony. Third, the statement must have been given
and taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony-to establish or prove some past fact
for possible use in a criminal trial. Fourth, the primary purpose for which a statement was given
and taken is to be determined 'objectively,' considering all the circumstances that might
reasonably bear on the intent of the participants in the conversation. Fifth, sufficient formality and
solemnity are present when, in a nonemergency situation, one responds to questioning by law
enforcement officials, where deliberate falsehoods might be criminal offenses. Sixth, statements
elicited by law enforcement officials are not testimonial if the primary purpose in giving and
receiving them is to deal with a contemporaneous emergency, rather than to produce evidence
about past events for possible use at a criminal trial.") (footnotes omitted).
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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tory" that would function independently of the mental state of the
declarant.
Determining in practice whether the appropriate mental state of the
declarant was present would often be difficult if mental state were in fact
relevant. How does one determine whether a declarant, objectively or
subjectively viewed, would reasonably expect or believe the statement to
be available for use by the prosecution? If the statement is made to the
police, do all statements automatically comply, even nonaccusatory
statements such as, "The last time I saw Harry was 8:00 p.m. yesterday
outside the apartment building"? What does "would" reasonably expect
mean in comparison to "could" or "may"? In short, is every statement
of every kind made to a police officer or other government official suffi-
ciently likely to be available for use prosecutorial to qualify?
What about statements not made to a government official? Under
Davis, all such statements are clearly nontestimonial falling outside the
core meaning of the Confrontation Clause-the principal evil of civil-
law-type ex parte examinations admitted against the accused. If Davis
had not effectively so held,53 how would the court determine whether
the declarant, most likely objectively, "would" reasonably expect or
believe the statement to be available to the prosecution for use at trial?
53. See cases cited infra note 104. Since Davis, there appears to be only one significant
outlier-People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333 (I11. 2007). In Stechly the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that statements made to nongovemment officials are not always "nontestimonial." Id. at
357-59. Instead, Stechly stated that with respect to such statements, the proper focus is on the
declarant's intent: "Would the objective circumstances have led a reasonable person to conclude
that their statement could be used against the defendant?" Id. at 359. In addition, Stechly
concluded that with respect to a child's statement to a nongovernment official, the child's age
should be treated as one of the objective circumstances to be taken into account in determining
whether a reasonable person in his or her circumstances would have understood that their
statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 363.
Stechly is simply incorrect given the Crawford/Davis pronouncement that a statement made
to a nongovernment official can sometimes be testimonial. Nothing in Davis, which both
narrowed and reinforced Crawford, permits such an interpretation. As Stechly itself recognized,
Crawford declared that the history of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment supports
two and only two inferences. Id. at 347. "First, the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 50 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the "Framers would not have
allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at
347 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54) (internal quotation marks omitted). When statements
are made to or elicited by a nongovernment official, the "principal evil" the Confrontational
Clause addresses is simply never present. Such statements, as every other reported opinion after
Davis concludes, are never testimonial. Stechly itself cites no opinions in support authored after
Davis. Nor does Stechly offer any rationale whatsoever as to why the Confrontation Clause
should apply to statements made to nongovemment officials. It simply concludes that certain
authority before Davis got it right and that it is the declarant's perspective that is paramount in
determining whether a statement to a nongovernment official is "testimonial" or "nontestimonial."
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Do reasonable people ever expect or believe statements not made to law
enforcement, not specifically intended to be conveyed to law enforce-
ment, would be used or available for use by the prosecution at a later
trial? If such circumstances in practice can exist only when the state-
ment is made to a government official, not only is any discussion of
declarant's intent theoretically incorrect and contrary to reported opin-
ions, but practically meaningless as well.54
How should one judge the twelve year old's statement, whether
made to his mother or a police officer? Should one apply an objective or
subjective test? The cases disagree." Fortunately, all the cases discuss-
ing the question of the declarant's mental state after Davis are simply
wrong because (1) all statements to a nongovernment official are nontes-
timonial and (2) the declarant's mental state is totally irrelevant in deter-
mining whether statements made to a government official are
testimonial.
"TESTIMONIAL" SHOULD ENCOMPASS SOLELY "ACCUSATORY"
STATEMENTS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be
confronted with witnesses against him." 6  Crawford equates "wit-
nesses" against the accused to witnesses who "bear testimony."57 "Tes-
timony" is then in turn defined as "'[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact."' 58 Such an interpretation of "witness against" the accused focuses
on formality and the statement's purpose as viewed from the declarant's
perspective. But Davis, in speaking about 911 calls, rejects by its hold-
54. See, e.g., State v. Camacho, 924 A.2d 99, 117 (Conn. 2007) ("With respect to Martin,
Henry made the contested statements to her on the night of the murders, in the privacy of their
motel room, before the police had contacted them. We are not persuaded by the defendant's
argument that Henry must have considered Martin to be a dishonest person based on his
relationship with her, and thus presumed that she would 'quickly tell police everything she knew
about the homicides and the murder weapon to protect herself from charges and to protect her
custody of her children."'); People v. Gash, 165 P.3d 779, 782 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) ("In
analyzing the circumstances surrounding the statements, we conclude that no objective witness in
the victim's position would believe that her statements would be used at trial. From the
perspective of an objective witness in the victim's position, it would be reasonable to assume that
the statements were only part of a private conversation with a relative, and not related to a
prosecution for a crime that had yet to occur. Thus, we conclude the victim was speaking
informally to her nephew.").
55. See generally Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 361-63 (considering objective and subjective
factors).
56. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
57. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 42).
58. Id. (quoting WEBSTER, supra note 42) (alteration in original).
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ing the concepts of formality and solemnity altogether and even more
importantly opined that the determination of what is or is not testimonial
is to be determined solely from the eliciting or receiving government
official's perspective and not from the declarant's, i.e., is the primary
purpose of the government official on receipt or on the eliciting of the
statement to meet an ongoing emergency or is the primary purpose of
the government official on receipt or eliciting of the statement to estab-
lish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion. In short, Davis, in its holding, as well as Crawford, in speaking of
the "principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,"59
rejects the idea that the term "witnesses" against the accused is defined
in terms of a formal solemn statement "made [by the declarant] for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact."
60
To properly interpret "testimonial," it is necessary to return to the
principal evil the Confrontation Clause was designed to address as
reflected in both Crawford and Davis. That principal evil was and is
government officials eliciting or receiving solely "accusatory state-
ments" from third parties.6' All of the historical discussion of Crawford
is in accord.62 An accusation is "a charge of wrongdoing, delinquency,
or fault[;] the declaration containing such a charge. ' 63 As currently
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the "charge of wrongdoing" that the
Confrontation Clause was designed to curb is an out-of-court declaration
charging the accused-i.e., the defendant now on trial-of having com-
mitted a crime. For example, "Harry Smith robbed me at gun point last
week." The Confrontation Clause should not be concerned with a
declarant's out-of-court statement that is unavailable to be cross-
examined at trial asserting only that a crime was committed, i.e., corpus
delicti. The Confrontation Clause should be concerned solely with the
"identification" of the accused as having committed a crime. Thus, the
out-of-court statement to a police officer, "I was robbed at gunpoint,"
would not evince the wrath of Justice Scalia. Nor would a statement,
"Harry left by taxi at 8:00 p.m.," similarly made to a police officer.
Such statements, not accusing the defendant of having committed a
crime, should be considered "nontestimonial" when made to a govern-
59. Id. at 50 (providing that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations of evidence against the accused") (emphasis added).
60. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006); see also id. ("A 911 call ... and at
least the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed to
"establis[h] or prov[e]" some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police
assistance.") (alteration in original).
61. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70.
62. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
63. WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 14 (1976).
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ment official even though the declarant "made [the statement] for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact."
In sum, the out-of-court statement should be found "testimonial"
only when it is an accusation of criminal conduct by an identified or
identifiable accused elicited or received by a government official under
circumstances objectively indicating that at the time elicited or received
the primary purpose for which the statement will be used by the govern-
ment is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later
criminal prosecution of the identified or identifiable perpetrator. The
content of the statement controls; the mental state of the declarant,
objectively or subjectively viewed, is irrelevant. Thus when made to a
government official both "Harry Smith robbed me at gun point last
week", accused identified, and "A very large, white man with a snake
tattoo on his left forearm robbed me last week," accused identifiable, are
"testimonial."
Crawford/Davis makes some sense, some sense only, when one
views the "principal evil" of admitting into evidence a nontestifying
third-party declarant's statement to government officials accusing the
current criminal defendant of having committed a criminal act presented
to the trier of fact absent the accused's ability to cross-examine the third-
party out-of-court declarant as extremely similar to, i.e., almost but not
quite, structural or fundamental error. Structural or fundamental error
"affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds."64 As stated in
Rose v. Clark, "[w]ithout these basic protections a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or inno-
cence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally
fair."6 5 Structural or fundamental error has been applied to errors that
undermine the entire trial process, e.g., right of counsel, biased judge, or
denial of a public trial.66 Structural or fundamental error affects the fair-
ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; namely, it
creates fundamental unfairness.67 Such errors require automatic reversal
regardless of whether the error can be shown to have substantially
affected the verdict and regardless of whether the error was properly
preserved below. Structural or fundamental error is not subject to
reversible-error, harmless-error, or plain-error analysis. 8 Although
Confrontation Clause errors under Crawford/Davis remain subject to
harmless-error analysis, Crawford/Davis clearly opines that presentation
64. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
65. 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., id. (listing cases and "basic protections").
67. See id. at 577.
68. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: AN INTRODUCTORY PROBLEM APPROACH 672-73
(2d ed. 2006).
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of statements-made by a declarant not available at trial for cross-exam-
ination accusing the criminal defendant now on trial of having commit-
ted a crime-affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
judicial proceedings whenever the statement is made by a nongovern-
ment official to a government official and the primary purpose for which
it was elicited or received is to establish a past event potentially relevant
to a later criminal prosecution of the person accused in the statement.
Such statements are "testimonial."
Concern with law-enforcement officials' conduct in gathering state-
ments from supposed witnesses to criminal conduct accusing the defen-
dant of having committed the offense emerged in Congress during its
debates in the early 1970s leading to the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. As proposed by the Advisory Committee, under Rule
801(d)(1)(A), all prior inconsistent statements of a declarant subject to
cross-examination were to become substantively admissible rather than
admissible solely for the purpose of impeachment. 69 But Congress
rejected the proposal in favor of limiting substantive admissibility of a
declarant's prior inconsistent statements who testifies at the trial or hear-
ing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement to those
statements "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition."7 Thus only those
prior inconsistent statements made under oath at formal proceedings are
now substantively admissible. Grand-jury testimony is included within
the concept of "other proceeding."7 Accordingly, statements, whether
oral or written, even if given under oath and videotaped, if made to law-
enforcement officials, fall outside the concept of "other proceedings."
The rationale behind the limited departure from the common law repre-
sented by Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is that expressed by the House Committee
on the Judiciary that (1) unlike most other situations involving unsworn
or oral statements, including, for example, oral statements made by an
occurrence witness to a crime, there can be no dispute about whether the
prior statement was made, and (2) the context of a formal proceeding
and an oath, provide firm additional assurances of the reliability of the
prior statement.72
Critics of the common-law prohibition against substantive use of a
prior inconsistent statement have long contended that the declarant at
69. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A) advisory committee's note, reprinted in PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 128 (John R. Schmertz, Jr. ed., 1974) ("Prior inconsistent statements
traditionally have been admissible to impeach but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule
they are substantive evidence.").
70. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A).
71. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 97.
72. Id.
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trial is under oath, his demeanor may be observed, his credibility tested
by cross-examination, and that the time of cross-examination is not criti-
cal.73 Rule 801(d)(1)(A) accepts the critics' arguments "only to the
extent that the non-contemporaneous cross-examination relates to a prior
inconsistent statement made under oath at a formal proceeding; substan-
tive admissibility is allowed only for those statements possessing the
highest degree of certainty of making made under circumstances condu-
cive to truth telling. 74
In short, just as Crawford/Davis doesn't trust the jury in a criminal
case to properly evaluate a police officer's in-court testimony that a third
party, who does not testify in court and subject to cross-examination, out
of court did in fact openly, freely, and without coercion, trickery, or
deception accuse the defendant of having committed the offense for
which he is on trial, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) doesn't trust a jury to evaluate a
police officer's in-court testimony that a third party who has testified in
court subject to cross-examination had in fact previously out of court,
inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony, openly, freely, and
without coercion, trickery, or deception told the police officer that the
defendant committed the crime for which he is on trial.75 Congress can
be seen as concluding that fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
judicial proceedings require that only those inconsistent statement alleg-
edly made to law-enforcement officials accusing the defendant of having
committed the crime for which he is on trial made under formal circum-
stances as to which there is substantial assurance of actual making be
admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
Similarly, Rules 803(8)(B) and (C) contain provisos added by Con-
gress during the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence operating in
criminal cases against the government that records, reports, statements,
or data compilations, in any form of public offices or agencies setting
forth matters observed under a duty imposed by law as to which matters
here was a duty to report, are excluded when police officers and other
law-enforcement personnel observed such matters,76 and are excluded
when the government in criminal cases offers such items set forth fac-
tual findings resulting from an investigation made under authority
granted by law.77 "The exclusion in Rule 803(8)(B) applies to observa-
tions made by police officers and other law-enforcement personnel at the
scene of the crime, at the apprehension of the accused, or otherwise in
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
76. See id. 803(8)(B).
77. See id. 803(8)(C).
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connection with an investigation."78 But it does not "apply to records of
routine, ministerial, objective nonevaluative matters made in nonadver-
sarial settings."79 The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
states that "the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police
officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant
are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases
because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police
and the defendant in criminal cases."80 Once again fairness, integrity,
and public reputation of judicial proceedings require exclusion.
APPLICATION SUMMARY
Having discussed the Crawford/Davis rule, this section summarizes
application of the rule by labeling various categories of statements or
evidence as "nontestimonial," "testimonial," or "available," thus satisfy-
ing the right to confrontation.
"AVAILABLE": THUS SATISFYING THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
Closed-circuit television.8
Lack of recollection. A witness's refusal or inability to recall the
events recorded in a prior statement does not render the witness unavail-
able for purposes of cross-examination and the Confrontation Clause.82
Written interrogatories. The availability of written interrogatories
satisfies the Confrontation Clause.83
"NONTESTIMONIAL" STATEMENT
Absence of existence of official public record.84
Admission by party-opponent, Rule 801(d)(2)(A).85
Autopsy reports.86
78. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at 156.
79. Id.
80. S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064.
81. See Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007).
82. See United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 555-56 (6th Cir. 2005); State v. Real, 150
P.3d 805, 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Fields, 168 P.3d 955 (Haw. 2007); State v. Rockette,
718 N.W.2d 269, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
83. See Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 537 (Tex. App. 2006).
84. See Jackson v. United States, 924 A.2d 1016 (D.C. 2007); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 644
S.E.2d 406 (Va. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Kirkpatrick, 161 P.3d 990 (Wash. 2007).
85. See United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2006); People v. Duff, 872
N.E.2d 46, 50-51 (111. App. Ct. 2007).
86. See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006); cf Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d
821, 845-46 (Md. 2006).
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Business records.
87
Certification of breath testing and similar equipment.88
Certified domestic and foreign business records, Rules 902(11) and
(12),89 and similar authentications.9'
Co-conspirator statement. Co-conspirator statements have been
found to be nontestimonial as verbal acts not being offered for their
truth9' or simply because Crawford says so.
9 2
Dying declaration.93
Medical diagnosis or treatment as primary purpose of statement,
even if person receiving statement associated with law enforcement.94
87. See United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 924, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2006); Feliz, 467 F.3d at
233-36; United States v. Baker, 458 F.3d 513, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2006).
88. See State v. Jacobson, 728 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2007); State v. Dorman, 922 A.2d 766 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); People v. Lebrecht, 823 N.Y.S.2d 824, 828 (App. Term 2006).
89. See Ellis, 460 F.3d at 927.
90. See United States v. Urqhart, 469 F.3d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 2006). Contra United States v.
Sandles, 469 F.3d 508, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2006).
91. See United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 499 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Van Sach,
458 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (10th Cir.
2006).
92. See McKinney v. State, 635 S.E.2d 153, 157-58 (Ga. 2006); cf United States v. W.R.
Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202-03 (D. Mont. 2006).
93. See People v. Taylor, 737 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
94. See State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 527 (Conn. 2006); State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296
(Iowa 2007); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 226-27 (Mass. 2006); State v.
Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007); State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 836, 839-40
(Ohio 2006).
With respect to classifying governmental social-services agency conduct as "law
enforcement," see People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 367 (Ill. 2007) ("The case is
distinguishable. First, in this case, we have not found Grote and Yates to have been acting on
behalf of law enforcement merely based on their status as mandated reporters. Our conclusion is
instead based primarily on the circumstances surrounding the statements they took from M.M.,
especially the fact that they appear to have done nothing as a result of taking those statements
other than contacting the authorities. The fact that they are mandated reporters merely buttresses
our conclusion. Moreover, C.J. was an appeal from a circuit court ruling dismissing a
delinquency petition because a Department investigator had destroyed potentially exculpatory
material. We held it would be entirely unfair to impute responsibility for the destroyed evidence
to the State's Attorney, especially in light of the fact that there was 'no evidence to support the
conclusion that the [Department] investigator here functioned, intentionally or otherwise, as an aid
in the prosecution of this case.' The situation here is different-in this case the question is
whether it is fair for a criminal defendant to be tried based on hearsay statements without the
opportunity to confront the declarant, when the persons taking the statements too no action other
than to pass them on to the authorities, and moreover the persons taking the statements had a legal
obligation to transmit them to the Department and subsequently to testify in any case arising
therefrom, and the Department had a legal obligation to cooperate with law enforcement agencies
to the fullest extent possible. In addition to the statement from C.J. to which the State draws our
attention, we also said in that case that 'where DCFS acts at the behest of an in tandem with the
State's attorney, with the intent and purpose of assisting in the prosecutorial effort, DCFS
functions as an agent of the prosecution.' We do not believe that the framers intended to permit
the government to evade the requirements of the confrontation clause by the simple expedient of
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Medical emergency.
9 5
Not hearsay statements. The Confrontation Clause does not apply
to out-of-court statements offered in evidence for a purpose other than
establishing the truth of the matter asserted as hearsay as defined in Rule
801(a)-(c), including 96 statements offered for their effect on listener,
97
to place other statements in context98 and as reasonably relied on under
Rule 703. 9
Official public records and the absence thereof.
Police ongoing or other emergency; initial investigation.'
Police ongoing or other emergency; 911.102
Rule of completeness. 103
Statements other than to government officials."o
"TESTIMONIAL" STATEMENT
Co-defendant's confession.'o5
placing responsibility for investigation with a separate agency of government with a legal
responsibility to cooperate with law enforcement.") (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
95. See State v. Alvarez, 143 P.3d 668, 674 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); In re German F., 821
N.Y.S.2d 410, 414-15 (Fam. Ct. 2006).
96. See United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Price
418 F.3d 771, 780-81 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 436 (5th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Trala, 386
F.3d 536, 544 (3d Cir. 2004); State v. Araujo, 169 P.3d 1123 (Kan. 2007); State v. Athan, 158
P.3d 27, 41 (Wash. 2007).
97. See United States v. Gibbs, 506 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 2007); State v. Wiggins, 648 S.E.2d
865, 871 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
98. See United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2006).
99. See United States v. Stone, 222 F.R.D. 334, 339 (E.D. Tenn. 2004); Veney v. United
States, 929 A.2d 448, 469 (D.C. 2007).
100. See State v. King, 146 P.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Jackson v. United
States, 924 A.2d 1016, 1020-21 (D.C. 2007); People v. Jambor, 729 N.W.2d 569, 573-74 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2007); Azeez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 456, 465-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jasper v.
Commonwealth, 644 S.E.2d 406, 410-11 (Va. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Kirkpatrick, 161 P.3d 990,
995-97 (Wash. 2007).
101. See People v. Cooper, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 13-16 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Pedroza, 54
Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 642-43 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 643 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 735 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 2007); State v. Ayer, 917 A.2d
214, 222 (N.H. 2006); People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188, 1189-90 (N.Y. 2007); People
v. Watson, 827 N.Y.S.2d 822, 836 (Sup. Ct. 2007); State v. Reardon, 860 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2006); State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 136, 147-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
102. See United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006); People v. Saracoglu, 62
Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 423-28 (Ct. App. 2007).
103. See People v. Parrish, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868 (Ct. App. 2007).
104. See State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1104-05 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006); Franklin v. State, 965
So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2007); In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (II1. App. Ct. 2004); State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d
135, 150 (Mo. 2007); Freeman v. State, 230 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); State v.
Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250, 256-57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). Contra People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d
333, 361-67 (I11. 2007).
105. See People v. Duff, 872 N.E.2d 46 (I11. App. Ct. 2007).
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Future prosecution was primary purpose of person receiving state-
ment of alleged victim made to medical professional associated with law
enforcement. 
1 16
No police or other ongoing emergency; initial investigation. 107
No police or other ongoing emergency; 91. 108
Plea allocution,0 9
It appears from reported decisions that lower courts have correctly
seized on a liberal interpretation of "ongoing emergency" set forth in
Davis in both the 911 and initial police contact contexts. Findings of the
existence of a medical emergency, as well as broadly interpreting police
emergency to include, among others, concern about potential future
criminal conduct of one kind or another, have significantly reduced what
is "testimonial" and the unnecessary, unhelpful, and potentially exces-
sive exclusionary power of Crawford/Davis. Similarly, finding nontesti-
monial statements made to medical professionals by alleged victims of
child and adult sexual abuse, received for the primary purpose of medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment even by a medical professional associated
with law enforcement, is both a correct and functionally useful interpre-
tation of Crawford/Davis.
FORENSIC LABORATORY REPORTS
The greatest difficulty that lower courts presently face in interpret-
ing Crawford/Davis concerns forensic laboratory reports created by
unavailable forensic technicians. A vast majority of reported decisions,
but by no means all reported decisions, declare forensic laboratory
reports to be "nontestimonial," in spite of the fact that they were pre-
pared by law-enforcement personnel with a view toward subsequent
criminal prosecution.11 ° But the rationales employed to accomplish this
clearly desirable result have, naturally enough given the structure of
Crawford/Davis themselves, been many. Some are useful and
insightful, while others are strained, to say the least.' 11
If, under Crawford, law-enforcement officials' interrogation of
106. See L.J.K. v. State, 942 So. 2d 854, 861 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); State v. Henderson, 160
P.3d 776, 789-92 (Kan. 2007); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 563-64 (N.D. 2006); State v. Pitt,
147 P.3d 940, 945 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
107. See Raile v. People, 148 P.3d 126, 133 (Colo. 2006); Commonwealth v. Galicia, 857
N.E.2d 463, 470 (Mass. 2006); State v. Graves, 157 P.3d 295, 300 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Mason v.
State, 225 S.W.3d 902, 911-12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
108. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006).
109. See United States v. Becker, 502 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2007).
110. See generally Cyrus P.W. Rieck, How To Deal with Laboratory Reports Under Crawford
v. Washington: A Question with No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 839 (2008)
111. See a summary of the reported decisions in People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 133-40 (Cal.
2007), Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007), and State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1
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third-party witnesses is the "principal evil" that the Confrontation
Clause addresses, then why wouldn't and shouldn't statements created
by law-enforcement officials themselves in the form of forensic labora-
tory reports the "primary purpose [of which] is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later current prosecutions," I12 not be "testi-
monial" and thus be barred by the Confrontation Clause in the absence
of the opportunity for cross-examination of the creating forensic labora-
tory technician?
What distinguishes forensic laboratory reports from an alleged vic-
tim's statements, days after the event, to a rape-crisis counselor or police
officer?
The critical distinction, occasionally recognized in various ways
and to various extents in state-court opinions applying Crawford/Davis
and holding that reports of unavailable laboratory technicians are "non-
testimonial," is and should be the concept of "accusatory" as developed
above. Obviously, forensic laboratory reports do not themselves accuse
an identified or identifiable person of having committed a crime. Foren-
sic laboratory reports concern matters such as matching ballistics, fin-
gerprints, or DNA, determining whether a gun was fired recently, and
whether the substance tested was cocaine. As such, forensic laboratory
reports are simply "nontestimonial." Finally, forensic laboratory reports
rarely involve contact between the laboratory technician and a person
who is not part of law enforcement, thus not bringing into play the prin-
cipal evil that Crawford/Davis asserts the Confrontation Clause was
enacted to address: the eliciting or receiving of government officials'
statements from nongovernment officials the primary purpose of which
elicited or received is to establish a past event that is potentially relevant
to a later criminal prosecution of the person accused in the statement.
(N.H. 2007), and compare State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). See
generally Rieck, supra note 110.
112. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 (2006).
